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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16 and § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
the

Subject

Was the Commission's decision that the usage of
Property

qualified

that

property

for

greenbelt

assessment rational and reasonable?
2.

Can a decision

regarding

taxation of property,

based on its usage, for one tax year be res judicata as to the
taxability of that property in a subsequent year?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Respondents Judd submit that the following statutes are
determinative of the issues presented by this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503:
(1) For general property tax purposes, the
value of land under this part is the value
which the land has for agricultural use if
the land:
(a) is not less than five contiguous
acres in area, except where devoted to
agricultural use in conjunction with other
eligible acreage or as provided under Subsection (3) ;
(b) has a gross income from agricultural use, not including rental income, of
at least $1000 per year;
(c) is actively devoted to agricultural
use; and

(d) has been devoted to agricultural
use for at least two successive years
immediately
preceding the tax year in
issue.
(2) Land which (a) is subject to the privilege tax imposed by Section 59-4-101, (b) is
owned by the state or any of its political
subdivisions, and (c) meets the requirements
of Subsection (1), is eligible for assessment
based on its agricultural value.
(3) The commission may grant a waiver of
the acreage limitation, upon appeal by the
owner and submission of proof that 80% or
more of the owner's, purchaser's, or lessee's
income is derived from agricultural products
produced on the property in question.
(4) (a) The commission may grant a waiver
of the income limitation for the tax year
in issue, upon appeal by the owner and submission of proof that the land was valued
on the basis of agricultural use for at
least two years immediately preceding that
tax year, and that the failure to meet the
income requirements for that tax year was
due to no fault or act of the owner, purchaser, or lessee.
(b) As used in this section, "fault"
does not include the intentional planting
of crops or trees which, because of the
maturation period, do not give the owner,
purchaser, or lessee a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the income requirement.
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-15(4):
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
or

(a) the agency action, or the statute
rule on which the agency action is
-2-

based, is unconstitutional on its face or
as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the
jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of
the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process,
or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency
action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i)
an abuse of the discretion
delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii)
agency;

contrary

to a rule of the

(iii) contrary
to the agency's
prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving
facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise
capricious.

-3-

arbitrary

or

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("Board")
has sought review by this Court of the ruling of the Utah State
Tax Commission ("Commission"), granting Respondents Judd's Application for greenbelt assessment of certain real property under
the Farmland Assessment Act ("FAA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-501,
et seq,, for the tax year 1989.

The Commission entered a final

Decision and Order on May 8, 1991, after a formal hearing, holding that the Judds1
1989.

property qualified

for FAA assessment in

The Board filed a petition for review of the Commission's

decision, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16, on May 31,
1991.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Judds have owned certain real property in Salt

Lake County for many years (the "Original Property").
the Judds applied

for

In 1976,

"greenbelt" assessment of the Original

Property under the FAA. R.31, U 1.
2.

The County Assessor accepted the Judds* petition,

on the grounds that the Original Property qualified
assessment.

for FAA

Thereafter, that property, at all times, has been

assessed as greenbelt property under the provisions of the FAA.
R.31, 11 1.

-4-

3.

In December, 1980, the Judds agreed to sell a por-

tion of the Original Property (the "Subdivision Property") to Jim
Pappas, who intended to develop a subdivision on the property.
Mr. Pappas recorded a subdivision plat for the Subdivision Property with the Salt Lake County Recorder in 1983.
4.

R.31, HU 2,4.

In connection with the Pappas transaction, all of

the Subdivision Property was conveyed to McGhie Land Title Company while initial steps in the development process took place.
R.31, 11 5.

However, as part of the consideration for the Judds1

sale to Mr. Pappas, the Judds retained beneficial ownership of a
portion of the Subdivision Property.

Id., 11 3.

Therefore, that

portion of the Subdivision Property designated by Mr. Pappas as
"Lots 1 through 16" was ultimately reconveyed to the Judds, with
curb and gutter, sewer and utility hookups, all added at Mr.
Pappas1 expense.

Id. , HU 3,4,8.

A plat map showing both the

Original Property and the Subdivision Property is attached hereto
as Appendix 2.
5.

In 1985, the Salt Lake County Assessor determined

that Lots 1 through 16 (then owned in their entirety by the
Judds) did not qualify for greenbelt assessment.
R.21.

R.31, U 8;

The Board now contends that this determination was made

because of the recording of the subdivision plat map and the
minor

improvements that had been made pursuant to the Judds1

-5-

agreement with Mr. Pappas.

R.31, H 8.

tion is that the determination

However, the Judds1 posi-

in 1985 was solely due to the

Assessor's position that Lots 1 through 16 were "not in agricultural use."

R.21.

In any event, the Judds were then subjected

to a rollback tax for those lots for the year 1985.
6.

The Judds appealed the County Assessor's decision

to withdraw Lots 1 through 16 from FAA assessment for the tax
year 1985 to the Commission and, ultimately, to the Tax Division
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County.
David Young
holding

rendered a decision

that

the Judds had

Judge

in 1990 (Civil No. 87-3472),

failed

to establish

that

Lots 1

through 16 were qualified for greenbelt assessment for the tax
year 1985.

R.33, Ut 9,10; R.16, U 6.

7.

The Judds subsequently

transferred ownership of

Lots 1, 2, 3 and 16 to third parties, and those lots are not at
issue in this appeal.

R.53, H 2.

were assessed as a subdivision.

In 1989, Lots 4 through 15

Petitioner's Brief at 9, 11 14.

The Judds appealed that assessment and requested FAA assessment
of Lots 4 through 15 (the "Subject Property"), which are immediately adjacent to the remainder of the Original Property.

Id. ,

11 15; Appendix 2.
8.

No physical barriers separate the Subject Property

from the remainder of the Original Property.

-6-

The only "division"

exists by virtue of a line on the recorded plat map.

Indeed, the

Judd Farm, consisting of both the remainder of the Original Property and the Subject Property, was fenced as one contiguous parcel between 1987 and 1989.-1
9.

R.22; R.15, 11 5.

In 1987, the entire Judd Farm, including both the

Original Property and the Subject Property, was leased to Stanley
Diamond, who grew wheat on the combined property.
10.

Bateman

Farms

replaced

lessee in 1987, after the harvest.

Diamond

as

R.15, H 6.
the

property

Bateman Farms cultivated the

land and then placed it in a crop-land retirement program administered by the United States Department of Agriculture, for the
1988 crop year.

During the fall of 1988, Bateman Farms again

planted wheat on the property, which was harvested during the
summer

of 1989.

combined property
for the year 1990.
11.

Subsequently, Bateman Farms again placed the
in the federal crop land retirement program,
R.15, U 6.

Thus, for the years 1987 through 1989, the Origi-

nal Property and the Subject Property were operated as a single
unit, and were subject to agricultural uses, all of which are
recognized under the FAA.

R.15, IW 5,6; R.22; R.33, 11 12.

1

The Board's repeated use of the phrase "improved building lots" with
respect to the Subject Property is both self-serving and misleading. There is
no evidence, nor any contention, that any buildings have ever been constructed
on the Subject Property.
-7-

12.

The area of the Subject Property, by itself, con-

stitutes less than five acres.

However, the area of the entire

Judd Farm, which is operated as a single unit, is in excess of
twenty acres.
13.

R.15, 1IH 3,4; Petitioner's Brief at 25.
The annual agricultural income from the combined

Judd Farm property exceeded $1,000 for each year during 1987-89.
R.15, 11 5; Petitioner's Brief at 8-9, 1111 11-13.
14.

The Board never has contended that the Original

Property, or the remainder of the Original Property, is not properly assessed under the provisions of the FAA.

R.33, K 12.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission's decision, finding that the Judd Farm
is

subject

to

greenbelt

assessment

under

the

FAA,

entirety, invoLved mixed questions of law and fact.

in

its

Pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), and Utah common law, review of
such questions is based upon a standard of reasonableness and
rationality.

In addition, agency expertise, particularly in con-

nection with matters, such as taxation, deemed peculiarly within
the agency's realm of competence, are accorded a great deal of
deference.
Thus, agency decisions reviewable by this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16, come cloaked within a fairly
high

degree

of

legitimacy,

particularly
-8-

where

the decisions

involve resolution of mixed questions of law and fact.

The

applicability of the FAA to the property at issue in this case
presents just such questions.

Therefore, it is up to the Board,

as the appellant, to convince this Court that the Commission's
decision was beyond the realm of reasonableness.

That, the Board

has not even attempted to do, instead, relying heavily on the
concept of res judicata.
However, the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable
to the issue of taxability of real property in a tax year that is
different from a tax year involved in a prior adjudication.

This

is particularly true where, as here, the issue of taxability is
use-dependent, and each tax year must be determined on its own
merits.
Finally, the Board's third argument, that the Subject
Property does not meet the statutory requirements under the FAA,
is based upon the erroneous premise that the Subject Property
stands on its own for all statutory determinations.

On the con-

trary, the very reason that the Commission ruled in the Judds'
favor below is that the Subject Property is operated as a single
farming unit, along with the remainder of the Original Property.
That being the case, the Board can no more require that the Subject Property separately qualify for FAA assessment than it can

-9-

impose suet a burden upon an individual acreage component cf the
Original Property.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION MUST BE UPHELD
BECAUSE IT IS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
A.

The Review Standard Applicable to the
Present Action is "Reasonableness and
Rationality."

In connection with any consideration of the appropriateness of a decision of a lower court or administrative agency,
the initial question that must be addressed is the standard of
appellate review.

Significantly, the Board fails even to address

the standard of review in its brief.

The standard applicable to

review of formal agency adjudications has existed by statute,
within

the Utah Administrative

1988.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 provides that final agency

actions

resulting

from

Procedures Act

formal

adjudicative

("APA"), since

proceedings

appealed immediately to Utah's appellate courts.

are

Subsection 4 of

that statute (set out in full, supra) provides the only grounds
upon which relief may be granted by the appellate courts, including, that "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law," (subsection (4)(d)), and "the agency action is otherwise
arbitrary or capricious" (subsection (4)(h)(iv)).

-10-

This statute has been interpreted by the Utah courts to
continue

the

existing

common

law,

three-level,

standard

of

review.

Thus, pure questions of law are deemed to be equally

well suited to judicial and agency expertise and are therefore
governed by a "correction of error" standard.

See Hurley v.

Board of Review of the Industrial Comm. of Utah, 767 P.2d 524,
527 (Utah 1988).

In effect, that standard is one of no deference

to the agency's decision.
The statute slightly changed the standard applicable to
purely factual questions, which are now subject to a test of
"substantial evidence."

That standard has been deemed satisfied

by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."

Johnson v. Department of

Employment Security, 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1989).

Signif-

icantly, the substantial evidence requirement does not mean that
only one conclusion from the evidence is permissible.
supra, 767, P.2d at 526-27.

Hurley,

Moreover, "the party challenging the

[factual] findings. . . must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the
Tax Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence."

Boston First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of

-11-

Equalization

of

Salt

Lake

County,

799

P.2d

1163,

1165

(Utah

1990).2
The most d e f e r e n t i a l

s t a n d a r d of

mixed q u e s t i o n s of law and f a c t ,
an a g e n c y ' s e x p e r t i s e ,

review i s a p p l i e d

which " a r e o f t e n

to

i l l u m i n a t e d by

and s p e c i a l t e c h n i c a l knowledge may be of

p a r t i c u l a r h e l p in d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e f a c t s f a l l w i t h i n
meaning of

statutory

terms."

Hurley,

Therefore,

an a g e n c y ' s " a p p l i c a t i o n of

supra,

767 P.2d

law t o i t s

at

factual

the
527.
find-

i n g s " w i l l not be d i s t u r b e d " u n l e s s i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n exceeds t h e
bounds of

reasonableness

and r a t i o n a l i t y . "

Johnson,

supra,

782

P.2d a t 968.
The r e a s o n a b l e and r a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d was a p p l i c a b l e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of mixed law and f a c t
law,

even p r i o r

t o adoption of

to

q u e s t i o n s under t h e common

t h e APA in Utah.

The

standard

e v o l v e s out of t h e concept t h a t d e f e r e n c e should be given t o matt e r s t h a t a r e p e c u l i a r l y w i t h i n t h e scope of agency e x p e r t i s e :
This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t :
Due t o t h e complexity of f a c t o r s involved in
t h e m a t t e r of zoning, as in o t h e r
fields
where c o u r t s review the a c t i o n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d i e s , i t should be assumed t h a t
2

Although respondents' position is that the issues resolved below were
neither purely factual nor purely legal, i t cannot be said that the evidence
presented below fails to meet even the standard. Indeed, the Board does not
even attempt to meet the burden of this standard and has neither marshalled
the evidence nor attempted to show why that evidence is not sufficient under
this standard. Such an omission is fatal to the Board's position, even if i t
could be said that the Commission's determinations were purely factual-12-

those charged with that responsibility (the
Board) have specialized knowledge in
that
field.
Accordingly, [administrative agencies] should be allowed a comparatively wide
latitude of discretion; and their actions
endowed with a presumption of correctness and
validity which the courts should not interfere with unless it is shown that there is no
reasonable basis to justify the action taken.
Xanthos v. Board of Adiustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032,
1034 (Utah 1984) (quoting, Cottonwood Heights Citizen Association
v. Board of Commissioners, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979)).
Applicability of the FAA to real property use constitutes precisely the kind of mixed question of law and fact to
which the deferential standard of review is applied:
An agency's interpretation of key provisions
of the statute it is empowered to administer
is often inseparable from its application of
the rules of law to the basic facts, discussed above. In reviewing decisions such as
these, a court should afford great deference
to the technical expertise or more extensive
experience of the responsible agency.
•

*

*

The degree of deference extended to the
decisions of the Commission on these intermediate types of issues has been given various
expressions, but all are variations of the
idea that the Commission's decisions must
fall within the limits of reasonableness and
rationality.
As used in this context, the
words "arbitrary and capricious" mean no more
than this.
Utah Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service Commiss., 658
P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983).

Therefore, the Commission's decision
-13-

in favor of

FAA assessment

of the Subject Property

First be

affirmed by this Court unless the Board can show that it was
arbitrary and capricious.
B.

This, the Board has failed to do.

The Board has Failed to Establish that
the Commission's Decision was Arbitrary
and Capricious.

One of the Board's principal arguments, both below and
on appeal, is that the Subject Property, standing alone, does not
meet the statutory requirements for FAA assessment because it
doesn't generate sufficient income and isn't of sufficient acreage.

The Board makes no legitimate effort to establish that the

Commission's finding that the combined Judd Farm fulfills those
standards

is not reasonable or rational.

Indeed, this Court

could take judicial notice of the fact that the combined property
exceeds five acres in area.

See Appendix 2.

Likewise, the tes-

timony below regarding the "agricultural income" of the combined
property was essentially undisputed, the Board having focused,
instead, on whether there were receipts kept of income generated
solely by the Separate Property.
The Board's focus on the Subject Property depends upon
two erroneous premises:

First, that the Subject Property is sep-

arate from the Original Property and, therefore, must be considered on its own (with respect to this argument, see Sections II
and III, infra) : and, Second, that the 1989 use of the Separate
-14-

Property, unlike the use of the Original Property, does not qualify as " a g r i c u l t u r a l use" under the FAA.
were rejected by the Commission.
the Board's argument that

Both of these premises

The second premise depends upon

the recording of a subdivision

plat

map, which includes the Subject Property, and the "improvement"
of the Subject Property with curb and g u t t e r , sewer and u t i l i t y
hookups, without respect to actual use, renders the Subject Property non-agricultural.

S i g n i f i c a n t l y , there is no s t a t u t o r y sup3

port for such a p o s i t i o n .
templates that

Indeed, the FAA i t s e l f obviously con-

the determination of

"agricultural

use" depends

upon the actual use of the property during the tax year in quest i o n , rather than upon any " p o t e n t i a l " higher use that the land
may have.

Thus, Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-502(1) defines "land in

a g r i c u l t u r a l use" as land that is "devoted to the r a i s i n g of useful p l a n t s . . . " o r that meets the requirements of "a crop-land
retirement

program

with

an

agency

of

the

state

or

federal

government."

3

In support of t h i s argument, the Board refers the Court to Nevada and
Arizona case law. That case law i s inapposite, however, since both of those
s t a t e s provide, by s t a t u t e , that the recording of a subdivision plat on the
property renders i t s use "non-agricultural." Significantly, Utah has no such
s t a t u t e and the Commission, in keeping with t h i s Court's d i r e c t i v e that tax
laws are interpreted in favor of the taxpayer (See Salt Lake County v. State
Tax Commission, i n f r a ) , decided not to impose such a r e s t r i c t i o n where i t does
not e x i s t in the Act.
-15-

The "devoted to" language of this section of the FAA
has been previously interpreted by this Court in Salt Lake County
v. State Tax Commission, 779 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1989).

In that

case, as in this one, the Commission granted FAA assessment of
the taxpayer's property, and its decision was appealed by the
Board.

The property at issue in that case was owned by Kennecott

Corporation and leased to Hercules, Inc. for a buffer zone around
its manufacturing plant in Magna.

Hercules had subleased the

subject property to third parties for grazing and growing wheat.
The Board argued that the property was used by Hercules "for
industrial purposes" and, therefore, did not qualify as "land in
agricultural use."
This Court disagreed with the Board's construction of
the FAA, and affirmed the Commission's decision, stating:
[The Board's] construction would be required
if the statute read "exclusively" or even
"primarily" devoted to an agricultural use.
No such terms appear in the statute, however,
and its plain meaning does not require such a
construction.
In fact, our practice is to
construe taxation statutes liberally in favor
of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists. The legislature
has determined that if land in Utah is used
for agricultural purposes, that land is qualified for assessment under the Act.
We reject the County's argument that the
word "devoted" requires exclusive use. Land
may be actively devoted to multiple purposes.
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779 P.2d at 1132-33 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The Salt Lake County
case.

rationale governs

the present

The Commission found, based upon the evidence presented at

the hearing below, that the Subject Property was devoted to agricultural use since the Subject Property was a contiguous part of
the Judd Farm and was used for both wheat farming and a federal
crop-land retirement program for the relevant years.
uses to which the Subject Property was devoted

Both of the

in the years

1987-89 are specifically qualified as "agricultural use" under
the FAA.

Pursuant to Salt Lake County, the fact that the Subject

Property may have other, potential, uses does not disqualify it
from FAA assessment.

The uncontroverted evidence established

that the Subject Property was not actively used for subdivision
purposes (such as home construction, rights of way, etc.) at any
time during the relevant time period.

Indeed, the Subject Prop-

erty has only slightly greater potential for such uses than does
the Original Property, which the Board does not contend is not
"devoted to" agricultural use.
The Commission's finding that the Subject Property is
"devoted to agricultural use," within the meaning of the FAA, is
fully supported by the evidence and cannot in any way be said to
be arbitrary or capricious.

Therefore, that finding must be

aff irmed.
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II.

THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT
.'LICABLE TO DETERMINATIONS OF TAX LIABILITY IN
DIFFERENT TAX YEARS.
The Board contends that the decision of the Third Judi-

cial District Court (Civil No. 87-3472), to the effect that the
Subject Property did not qualify for greenbelt assessment under
the FAA for the tax year 1985, is "res judicata" in this action.
Therefore, the Board argues, the Commission was compelled to rule
that the current petition for FAA assessment, which covers tax
year 1989, did not satisfy the Actfs requirements.
Res judicata precludes relitigation of identical causes
of action in subsequent proceedings.

Commissioner of Internal

Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1947).

The related concept

of collateral estoppel, which is obviously the principle upon
which the Board actually relies, precludes relitigation of issues
"which were actually presented and determined in the first suit."
Id.

In this case, the Commission ruled that "res judicata" was

not applicable since the petitions involved different factual
issues.

That ruling is supported by both the United States and

Utah Supreme Courts.
Thus, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen,
supra, the Court considered the issue of whether income from patents should be taxed to an individual taxpayer or to a corporation in which he owned a controlling interest since the taxpayer

-18-

had licensed the patent to the corporation.

The taxpayer's posi-

tion was that a previous Board of Tax Appeals decision

in his

favor on that issue, covering prior tax years, was res judicata
in the subject action.

The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that

tax liability in different tax years typically involves changes
in significant facts:
Income taxes are levied on an annual basis.
Each year is the origin of a new liability
and of a separate cause of action. Thus if a
claim of liability or non-liability relating
to the particular tax year is litigated, a
judgment on the merits is res judicata as to
any subsequent proceeding involving the same
claim and the same tax year.
But if the
later proceeding is concerned with a similar
or unlike claim relating to a different tax
year, the prior judgment acts as a collateral
estoppel only as to those matters in the second proceeding which were actually presented
and determined in the first suit.
* * *

And so where two cases involve income
taxes in different taxable years, collateral
estoppel must be used with its limitations
carefully in mind so as to avoid injustice.
It must be confined to situations where the
matter raised in the second suit is identical
in all respects with that decided in the
first proceeding and where the controlling
facts and applicable legal rules remain
unchanged.
333 U.S. at 598, 599-600 (emphasis added).

In Sunnen, the prior

ruling had involved consideration of a different, albeit essentially

identical,

licensing

contract
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than

the

one

at

issue.

Under those circumstances, the Court found it "readily appr -ent"
that collateral estoppel did not apply, and the Tax Court's decision against the taxpayer was affirmed.
The Utah Supreme Court also has considered the principle of res judicata in connection with tax liability, and similarly has held that it is generally not applicable in such cases,
stat ing:
Generally, in tax litigation, res judicata
has no application in a suit challenging the
propriety of a tax obligation accrued in tax
periods subsequent to those at issue in the
original litigation.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Salt Lake City, 596 P.2d 649,
651 (Utah 1979).

In that case, the Court considered the consti-

tutionality of Salt Lake City's franchise fee and utility revenue
tax.

The tax previously had been upheld on appeal as constitu-

tional.

However, the tax had increased from two to eight percent

in the interim.

The City argued that the prior decision of con-

stitutionality was res judicata.
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, on the grounds that
the tax years in question were different and the commercial situation for telephone suppliers

(such as the plaintiff

in that

case) had changed since the prior decision by virtue of several
FCC decisions.

Therefore, summary judgment entered by the trial

court in the City's favor was reversed.
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In the prior related case at issue, the District Court
ruled that the Subject Property was not qualified for FAA assessment for tax year 1985 because it was "separated" from the Original Property by virtue of the recording of the subdivision plat
map (R.55, 11 1), and because the Subject Property, alone, was
"not 'actively devoted to agricultural use1 in 1985" (id., U 5,
emphasis added).

That conclusion was based, rightly or wrongly,

on facts that existed in 1985, and the two years prior thereto
(See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503(1)(d)).

Those facts included the

transfer of the Subdivision Property to McGhie and the improvement of the property in the early 1980's.
The present case concerns tax liability of the Subject
Property in 1989 and involves use of the property some four years
after the use that was considered by the District Court.

That

use was considered by the Commission and determined to qualify
the Subject Property for FAA assessment.

The Board cannot rea-

sonably contend that the Commission's determination, which the
Board has not seriously attempted to show was not supported by
substantial evidence, should be replaced by a District Court
determination

regarding use some four years previous thereto.

Such an absurd result is absolutely precluded by the Sunnen and
Mountain States decisions.

-21-

In any event, a finding by the D i s t r i c t Court *:u-z the
Subject Property was "separated" from the Original Property
the

tax

year

1985,

even if

would not compel a d i f f e r e n t

given c o l l a t e r a l
result,

estoppel

for

effect,

since there is nothing

in

the FAA that precludes the addition of property to an already
4
qualified parcel.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-504 allows the owner of
property t h a t q u a l i f i e s under the d e f i n i t i o n s of the FAA to apply
for FAA assessment of that property at any time.
qualifications

The s t a t u t o r y

are only that the land be "devoted to"

agricul-

t u r a l use and have been so devoted for a period of two y e a r s .
Thus, the relevant consideration is whether the Subject Property
was devoted to a g r i c u l t u r a l use in 1987 through 1989 (a period
never considered by the d i s t r i c t court, d e s p i t e the date of

its

d e c i s i o n ) , and not whether the Subject Property was "separated"
from the Original Property at any time p r i o r t h e r e t o .
Thus, whether or not the Subject Property was indeed
"separated"

from

the

original

4

property

prior

to

1987

is

Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503(1)(a) s p e c i f i c a l l y provides t h a t quali f i e d property need not exceed five acres in area where i t i s "devoted to
a g r i c u l t u r a l use in conjunction with other e l i g i b l e acreage . . ."(emphasis
added).
This provision strongly supports the Judds' p o s i t i o n , which was
accepted by the Commission, that property can be added to qualified property,
even if previously separated.
There i s nothing in the Act, as the Board
implies, requiring an owner of "subdivision" property to affirmatively prove
i t s "withdrawal" from the subdivision. The FAA requires only t h a t the prope r t y be "devoted to a g r i c u l t u r a l use."
-22-

irrelevant.

The Commission has determined, using its expertise

in applying tax law, that the Subject Property need not independently qualify for FAA assessment where it is operated as a single unit with FAA qualified property and is devoted to agricultural use.

That decision cannot be said to be arbitrary or

capricious.
III. PETITIONER'S THIRD ARGUMENT ERRONEOUSLY PRESUPPOSES THE VALIDITY OF ITS SEPARATION OF
PROPERTIES ARGUMENT.
The Board's third argument in its brief is that the
Judds failed to establish that the Subject Property qualified for
FAA assessment in 1989 since it is not five acres in area and
does not generate $1,000 in "agricultural income."

This argument

depends entirely on the erroneous premise that the Subject Property may only be considered on its own merits, independently of
the Original Property.

However, that requirement is not war-

ranted by the facts of this case, and presupposes the legitimacy
of the Board's argument that the Subject Property was "separate"
from the Original Property in 1989.
The evidence below established that there is no physical separation in the Judd Farm, even though some physical separation

is

allowable

under

the

FAA.

See

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 59-2-515, granting rulemaking authority to the Commission, and
"Assessors Handbook," (Appendix 2 to Appellant's Brief), at 14,
-23-

U 9, which was promulgated under that authority.

On the con-

trary, the property is fenced as a contiguous unit, and is owned,
leased and operated as a single unit.

Under these facts, there

is no question but that the Judd Farm, if it had never before
been assessed under the FAA, would be found to qualify, in its
entirety, for such assessment.

The fact that the Original Prop-

erty has always qualified for FAA assessment should not operate
to the prejudice of the Judds in obtaining FAA assessment of the
Subject Property, nor should the fact that the Subject Property
may once have been separated from the Original Property preclude
it from ever becoming a part of that property again.

Indeed, no

such obstacles to FAA assessment can be found in the Act itself.
The Commission's decision in favor of FAA assessment of
the Subject
Property

Property

need

not

necessarily

independently

determines
qualify

for

that

the Subject

FAA assessment,

whether or not it was once separated from the Original Property,
so long as all of the property is operated as a single unit.
Such a decision, applying the law to the facts, is not arbitrary
or capricious, but is in fact the proper construction of the FAA.
Indeed, it would make no more sense to require the separate property to independently meet the FAA requirements than it would to
impose the same requirement on any other acreage within the Judd
Farm.

-24-

CONCLUSION
The Commission's decision that the Subject Property,
used

in conjunction with the Original Property, qualifies for

greenbelt assessment under the FAA is reasonable and rational and
supported by the evidence below.

Therefore, the Board has failed

to meet its burden on appeal, and the Commission's decision must
be affirmed by this Court.
DATED this 30th day of September, 1991.

CENT W. WINTERHOLLER
JULIA C. ATTWOOD
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondents/
Appellees Judd
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R. Paul Van Dam
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Leon A. Dever
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36 South State Street, Suite 1100
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State Tax Commission
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APPENDIX 1

«ki'J «>*££"
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
THOMAS E. & MARY LU E. JUDD,

)

Petitioners, )
V.

)

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF )
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
)
Respondent.

)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION
Appeal Nos. 90-0528 to
90-0539
Serial Nos. See Attachment

STATEMENT OF CASE
The above-referenced appeals, having been consolidated
for hearing and decision, came before the Tax Commission for
formal hearing on October 22, 1990.

Alan Hennebold, Presiding

Officer, conducted the proceedings for and on behalf of the Tax
Commission.

Petitioners, Thomas E. Judd and Mary Lu E. Judd,

appeared on their own behalf.

Bill Thomas Peters appeared on

behalf of the Respondent.
Based on the evidence presented during the hearing in
this

matter,

and

after

consideration

of

the parties' post

hearing memoranda, the Tax Commission makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

tax

in

question

is

property

tax.

The

Petitioners seek assessment of the subject properties under the
Farmland Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann. §59-2-501 et seq.

2.

The period in question is January 1, 1989.

3.

The subject properties are 12 vacant lots owned

by the Petitioners and located in a residential subdivision at
approximately 9213 South 3730 West, West Jordan, Utah.

Each

lot consists of 1/4 acre with curb, gutter and utilities.
4.
"Judd

The Petitioners

farm"

hereafter)

properties.

also

own

directly

a 29 acre farm (the

east

of

the

subject

The Judd farm has qualified for valuation under

the Farmland Assessment Act during all years material hereto.
5.

From

1987 through

1989, the subject properties

were fenced except on their east side where they adjoined the
Judd farm.

During those three years, the subject properties

and the Judd farm (the "combined properties" hereafter) were
operated as a single unit.
6.
the

In 1987, Stanley Diamond rented and grew wheat on

combined

Bateman

properties.

Farms

replaced

After

Diamond

the
as

wheat

renter.

was

harvested,

Bateman

Farms

cultivated the land, then placed it in a crop-land retirement
program administered by the federal Department of Agriculture
for the 1988 crop year.

During the fall of 1988, Bateman Farms

planted wheat, then harvested it during the summer of 1989.
Afterwards,

Bateman

Brothers

again

placed

the

combined

properties in a federal crop-land retirement program for 1990.
5.

Neither

the

Petitioners

nor

their

renters

maintained records of the agricultural income derived from the
subject properties alone.

However, more than $1,000 in gross

agricultural income was derived from the combined properties
during each year from 1987 through 1989.
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6.

iy«b, tne petitioners sov ^nt assessment of the

subject properties under the Farmland Assessment Act.
Commission denied their
further

appeal, the

Tax

request.

The Tax

Following the Petitioners'

Division of

Utah's

Third

Judicial

District Court affirmed the denial of Petitioners' request far^
farmland assessment for the 1986 tax year.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The

Utah

Farmland

Assessment

Act, Utah

Code Ann.

§59-2-501 et seq. , permits assessment of land at its value for
agricultural use, under the following criteria:
a.

The land is not less than five contiguous acres,

except where devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with
other eligible acres.
b.

The land has a gross income from agricultural use,

not including rental income, of at least $1000 per year;
c.

The land is actively devoted to agricultural use;

d.

The land has been devoted to agricultural use for

and

at least two successive years immediately preceding the tax
year in issue.
DECISION AND ORDER
Generally, land is assessed for property tax purposes
according

to

its

"highest

and best" use.

Utah's Farmland

Assessment Act provides an exception to the foregoing rule by
allowing

assessment

of

land

according

to

its

agricultural

value, even if some other use might result in a higher value.
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Three

conditions

must

be

met

bt jre

assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act.
must

be

at

least

five

acres

in

size,

or

land

can

be

First, the land
be

devoted

to

agricultural use in conjunction with other eligible acreage.
Second, the land must have a gross

income from- agricultural

use, not including rental income, of at least $1,000 per year.
Finally,

the

property

must

be

actively

dedicated

to

agricultural use during the year for which farmland assessment
is sought and for two prior years.

The Petitioners contend the

subject properties meet each of the foregoing conditions.
Regarding the requirement
least

five

acres

or

be

that the land

devoted

to

contain

agricultural

use

at
in

connection with other eligible acreage, it is undisputed that
the subject properties amount to less than five acres even when
added together.

However, during 1987 through 1989 the subject

properties and the remainder of the Judd farm were farmed as
one unit.

The Judd farm has already been found eligible for

assessment

under

the

Farmland

Assessment

Commission therefore finds that the subject

Act.

The

properties

Tax
were

devoted to agricultural use in connection with other eligible
acres, thereby satisfying the first condition for assessment as
farmland.
The second requirement is that the properties produce
gross income from agricultural use, excluding rental income, of
at

least

$1,000

per

year.

The

Tax

Commission

notes

the

Respondent's argument that each of the subject properties must
separately meet the $1,000
cases where

income requirement.

land is combined

However,

in

for agricultural purposes with

-4-
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ina, the Tax Commission concludes the $1,000

income requirement applies to aggregate value of agricultural
production from the combined properties.

The Petitioners have

established that the combined properties produced

more than

$1,000 in gross income from agricultural use during each year
from

1987 through

1989.

The Tax Commission

concludes

the

subject properties meet the Farmland Assessment Act's income
test.
Finally,

the

land

must

be

actively

devoted

to

agricultural use during the year for which farmland valuation
is sought, as well

as

the

two preceding

years.

That the

property may have uses in addition to its agricultural use does
not

prevent

assessment.

the
Salt

property
Lake

from

County

qualifying

ex

rel.

for

County

farmland
Board

of

Equalization v. State Tax Commission ex rel. Kennecott Corp.,
779 P. 2d 1131 (Utah 1989)

The testimony of the Petitioners

and their renters establishes that the subject property was
either actively devoted to agricultural production from 1987
through

1989

or

was

included

in

federal

crop

reduction

programs, which are recognized by the Farmland Assessment Act
as being active agricultural use.
the

Farmland

Assessment

Act's

The Petitioners thereby meet
requirement

of

active

decisions

denying

agricultural use.
The Respondent

argues

that prior

Petitioners' request for farmland assessment for the 1986 tax
year are binding with respect to the 1989 tax year as well.
Respondent contends that principles of collateral estoppel bar
relitigation of the factual

issues which were

-5-

litigated and

iOesolved

in

the

1986

case.

The

correct as a general principle.

Respondent's

position

is

However, because the factual

basis upon which farmland assessment is based changes from year
to

year, property not

next.

qualifying

one year may qualify the

The interpretation of law is not subject to collateral

estoppel in any event.

Consequently, the Tax Commission and

District Court decisions on the 1986 appeal do not serve as a
basis for resolving this 1989 appeal.
As the Petitioners have demonstrated that the subject
properties

meet

Assessment

Act,

Petitioners'

each

conditions

the

request

Tax
for

forth

Commission
assessment

granted for the 1989 tax year.
and Auditor

set

in the

concludes

Farmland
that

the

under that Act must be

The Salt Lake County Assessor

are instructed to adjust their records and take

such other action as is necessary to implement this decision.
DATED this

XA

day of

_M,

, 1991.

BY ORDER OP THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

roe B. Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Cojsc^525^
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. § § 6 3 - 4 6 ^ ^ 0 ^ ^ ^ >;
63-46b-14<2> (a) .
^ >
<<%
'x.

"i SEAL J.

AH/jd/1647w
-6-

APPENDIX 2

*

•<n/

- - i

T^H

'1^4. s, ' ,J . /

'—TTT

SALT
E '/a SW i/4

LAKE
SEC

CO

5 T3S

R IW

APPENDIX 3

PART 5
FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT
59-2-501. Short title.
This part is known as the 'Farmland Assessment
Act"
1987
59-2-502. Definitions.
As used in this part
(1) 'Land in agricultural u s e ' means
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful
plants and animals, such as
d) forages and sod crops,
<n) grains and feed crops,
(in) livestock as defined in Section
59-2-102,
Ov) trees and fruits, or
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock, or
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments
or other compensation under a crop-land retirement program with an agency of the
state or federal government
(2) "Roll-back" means the period preceding the
withdrawal of the land from the provisions of this
part or the change in use of the land, not to exceed five years, during which the land is valued,
assessed, and taxed under this part
1988

59-2-503. Qualifications for agricultural use valuation.
(1) For general property tax purposes, the value of
land under this part is the value which the land has
for agricultural use if the land
(a) is not less than five contiguous acres in
area, except where devoted to agricultural use in
conjunction with other eligible acreage or as provided under Subsection (3),
(b) has a gross income from agricultural use t
not including rental income, of at least $1000 per
year,
(c) is actively devoted to agricultural use, and
(d) has been devoted to agricultural use for at
least two successive years immediately preceding
the tax year in issue
(2) Land which (a) is subject to the privilege tax
imposed by Section 59 4-101, (b) is owned by the state
or any of its political subdivisions, and (c) meets the
requirements of Subsection <1), is eligible for assessment based on its agricultural value
(3) The commission may grant a waiver of the
acreage limitation, upon appeal by the owner and
submission of proof that 80% or more of the owner's,
purchasers, or lessees income is derived from agricultural products produced on the property in question
(4) (a) The commission may grant a waiver of the
income limitation for the tax year in issue, upon
appeal by the owner and submission of proof that
the land was valued on the basis of agricultural
use for at least two years immediately preceding
that tax year, and that the failure to meet the
income requirements for that tax year was due to
no fault or act of the owner, purchaser, or lessee
(b) As used in this section, "fault" does not include the intentional planting of crops or trees
which, because of the maturation period, do not
give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a reasonable
opportunity to satisfy the income requirement
1987

59-2-504. Application requirements — Change
in land use or withdrawal.
(1) T h e owner of land eligible for valuation under
this part shall submit an application to the county
assessor of the county in which the land is located
Applications shall be accepted if filed prior to March
I of the tax year in which valuation under this part is
first requested Any application submitted after January 1 is subject to a $25 late filing fee Filing fees
shall be paid to the county treasurer at the time the
application is filed All applications filed under this
subsection shall be recorded by the county recorder.
(2) Once valuation under this part has been approved, the owner is not required either to file again
or give any notice to the county assessor, until a
change in the land use occurs Failure of the owner to
notify t h e county assessor and pay the roll-back tax
imposed by Section 59-2-506 within 90 days after any
change in land use subjects the owner to a penalty of
100% of the roll-back tax due.
(3) A n y change in land use or other withdrawal of
land from the provisions of this part subjects the land
to the roll-back tax whether the change or withdrawal is voluntary or involuntary, unless the change
in use or other withdrawal is due to ineligibility resulting solely from amendments to this part.
(4) Land which becomes exempt from taxation under Article XIII, Sec 2, Utah Constitution, is not considered withdrawn from this part if the land continues to be used for agricultural purposes
1987
59-2-505.

Indicia of value for agricultural use
assessment — Inclusion of fair market
value on tax notice.
If valuing land which qualifies as land actively devoted to agricultural use under the test prescribed by
Subsection 59-2-503(1), and for which the owner has
made a timely application for valuation, assessment,
and taxation under this part for the tax year in issue,
the assessor shall consider only those indicia of value
which the land has for agricultural use as determined
by the commission The assessor shall also include
the fair market value assessment on the tax notice
The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value and fair market value assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001.
1987

59-2-506. Rollback tax — Recordation — Lien —
Computation of tax — Procedure —
Collection — Distribution.
(1) If land which is or has been in agricultural use,
and is or h a s been valued, assessed, and taxed under
this part, is applied to a use other than agricultural
or is otherwise withdrawn from the provisions of this
part, it is subject to an additional tax referred to as
the "rollback tax," and the owner shall, within 90
days after the change m land use, notify the county
assessor of the change in land use and pay the rollback tax
(2) Upon receipt of the notice, the county assessor
shall cause the following statement to be recorded by
the county recorder MOn ( date ) this land became
subject to the rollback tax imposed by Section
59-2-506 "
(3) The rollback tax is a hen upon the land until
paid, and is due and pa>able at the time of the change
in use.
(4) The assessor shall determine the amount of the
rollback tax by computing the difference between the
tax paid while the land was valued under this part,
and that which would have been paid had the property not been valued under this part The county trea-

surer shall collect the rollback tax and certify to the
county recorder that the rollback tax hen on the property has been satisfied
(5) The assessment of the rollback tax imposed by
Subsection (1), the attachment of the hen for these
taxes, and the right of the owner or other interested
party to review any judgment of the county board of
equalization affecting the rollback tax, shall be governed by the procedures provided for the assessment
and taxation of real property not valued, assessed,
and taxed under this part. The rollback tax collected
shall be paid into the county treasury and paid by the
treasurer to the various taxing units pro rata in accordance with the levies for the current year
i&87

59-2-507. Land included as agricultural — Site
of farmhouse excluded — Taxation of
structures and site of farmhouse.
(1) Land under barns, sheds, silos, cribs, greenhouses and like structures, lakes, dams, ponds,
streams, and irrigation ditches and like facilities is
included in determining the total area of land
actively devoted to agricultural use. Land which is
under the farmhouse and land used in connection
with the farmhouse, is excluded from that determination.
(2) All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse and the land on which
the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection
with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and
taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other
land in the county.
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59-2-508.

Application — Consent to audit and
review — Purchaser's or lessee's affi-

davit
(1) Any application for valuation, assessment, and
taxation of land in agricultural use shall be on a form
prescribed by the commission, and provided for the
use of the applicants by the county assessor The application shall provide for the reporting of information pertinent to this part A certification by the
owner that the facts set forth in the application are
true may be prescribed by the commission in lieu of a
sworn statement to that effect Statements so certified are considered as if made under oath and subject
to the same penalties as provided by law for perjury.
(2) All owners applying for participation under
this part and all purchasers or lessees signing affidavits under Subsection (3) are considered to have given
their consent to field audit and review by both the
commission and the county assessor. This consent is a
condition to the acceptance of any application or affidavit
(3) Any owner of lands eligible for valuation, assessment, and taxation under this part due to the use
of that land by, and the gross income qualifications
of, a purchaser or lessee, may qualify those lands by
submitting, together with the application under Subsection (1), an affidavit from that purchaser or lessee
certifying those facts relative to the use of the land
and the purchaser's or lessee's gross income which
would be necessary for qualification of those lands
under this part
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59-2-509. Change of ownership.
Continuance of valuation, assessment, and taxation under this part depends upon continuance of the
land in agricultural use and compliance with the
other requirements of this part, and not upon continuance in the same owner of title to the land Liability
to the roll-back tax attaches when a change m use or

other withdrawal of the land occurs, but not when a
change in ownership of the title takes place, if the
new owner both (1) continues the land in agricultural use under the conditions prescribed in this part,
and <2) files a new application for valuation, assessment, and taxation as provided in Section 59-2 508
1887

59-2-510. Separation of land.
Separation of a part of the land which is being valued, assessed and taxed under this part, either by
conveyance or other action of the owner of the land,
for a use other than agricultural, subjects the land
which is separated to liability for the applicable roilback tax, but does not impair the continuance of agricultural use valuation, assessment, and taxation for
the remaining land if it continues to meet the requirements of this part
1887
59-2-511.

Acquisition of farmland by government agency — Requirements.
(1) The acquisition by a government agency of land
which is being valued, assessed, and taxed under this
part, if there is a change in use, subjects the land so
acquired to the rollback tax imposed by this part,
unless
(a) the land acquisition is by eminent domain,
(b) the land is under the threat or imminence
of eminent domain proceedings and the owner of
record is notified in writing of the proceedings, or
(c) the land is donated to a governmental entity, but excluding dedications of public rights-ofway
(2) The tax shall be paid by the owner of record
before title may pass Prior to payment by the acquiring agency, it shall notify the county assessor of the
county in which the property is located of the sale and
receive a clearance from the assessor that rollback
taxes have been paid or that the property is not subject to the assessment
(3) If land is acquired pursuant to Subsection
(l)(a), (b), or (c)f the acquiring government agency
shall make a one-time in lieu fee payment to the taxing entity entitled to the rollback tax in the amount
of the rollback tax due and payable
1990
59-2-512. Land located in more than one county.
Where contiguous land in agricultural use in one
ownership is located in more than one county, compliance with the requirements of this part shall be determined on the basis of the total area and income of
that land, and not the area or income of land which is
located in any particular county
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59-2-513. Tax list and duplicate.
The factual details to be shoun on the assessors's
tax list and duplicate with respect to land which is
being valued, assessed, and taxed under this part are
the same as those set forth by the assessor with respect to other taxable property in the county
1987
59-2-514.

State Farmland Evaluation Advisory
Committee — Membership — Duties.
(1) There is created a State Farmland Evaluation
Advisory Committee consisting of five members appointed as follows
(a) one member appointed by the commission
who shall be chairman of the committee,
(b) one member appointed by the president of
Utah State University,
(c) one member appointed by the state Department of Agriculture,
(d) one member appointed by the state County
Assessors' Association, and

(e) one member actively engaged in farming or
ranching appointed by the other members of the
committee
(2) The committee shall meet at the call of the
chairman to review the several classifications of land
in agricultural use in the various areas of the state
and recommend a range of values for each of the classifications based upon productive capabilities of the
land when devoted to agricultural uses The recommendations bhall be submitted to the commission
prior to October 2 of each year
1987
59-2-515. Rules prescribed by commission.
The commission may promulgate rules and prescribe forms necessary to effectuate the purposes of
this part
1987

